A number of risks are considered by the IOC, such as the procedures for selecting a host city for the Olympics (national policy) and their controls, the application of measurable criteria for maintaining a sport for the benefit of another at the Olympic Games (conflict between a traditional sport and a “fun” / the “gigantism” of the Olympics), the necessity to set up a jurisdiction hierarchy within the FIs and to have access to the CAS (e.g. FILA during the OG in 2008), the definition of the rules applied for the redistribution of the Olympic revenues, controls in the implementation of development plans (e.g.in the International Judo Federation, there are no controls), “competition” between the IOC and the IFs about the development of Sport (recognition of states/countries for the creation of NOCs and National Sporting Federations), the use of the Olympic receipts (IFs or NOCs) for diverted aims (arms trade), etc.
But the greatest risks to be considered for the IOC in the coming months are:
– The use of the “anti-corruption” image to create a “World Anti-Corruption Agency” WACA as Dick Pound proposed in 2009, which could mean: “Sport Management = Corruption”!
– The creation of a supervisory body in the UN Watch (to defend athletes’ rights);
– The ownership of the control rights by another organisation (financial interests);
– The pressure of the media (the same as in 1998-1999, before the IOC Report 2000);
– The new body would own a large international medium (e.g.: consumers’ rights, that is to say, athletes);
– Contrary to WADA and to the CAS, the new body would have no direct connection with the world of sport;
But the greatest risk lies in the slowness of the IOC to change, that is to say, to react and quickly create an independent control body.
Here is a concrete example: if the Commissions responsible for legislation on sport in the European Commission, spurred by the major European media, developed a law on TV rights, these Commissions might be able to operate before the world of sport. Such a law on TV rights could include a maximal cap, a distribution key with a withholding tax accruing to the signing Country – 30% to be distributed to aid projects for development and to sports projects in the developing countries – 40% to be returned to the organising country (with a 10% tax) and 30% remaining in the safes of the IF.
Here is another example: if these Commissions asked the world of sports (FI) to replace their customs by strict rules, these rules must be enacted by the EC as the only alternative to the world of sport, but if an independent agency was created, it would enact such rules and would help transform the IF customs into rules in agreement with all the world sports bodies.